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This essay explores the reasons why Enver Pasha, one of the exiled Young Turk rulers of 
the Ottoman Empire, decided to lead a Central Asian resistance movement called the 
Basmachi Rebellion from 1921 until his death at the hands of the Soviets in August 1922. 
This essay examines political and social developments in the Ottoman Empire and Russia 
which were an influence on Enver’s decision to join the Basmachi movement. It argues 
that although some historians have viewed Enver’s actions in Central Asia as foolish and 
badly planned, his decisions can be understood within the context of the Pan-Turkic and 
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ENVER PASHA AND THE BASMACHI REBELLION 
 
In this essay I will explore the reasons why Enver Pasha, one of the Young Turk rulers of the Ottoman Empire, 
would choose to join a Central Asian resistance movement called the Basmachi rebellion. For a short period 
from late 1921 through to his death in battle against the Soviets in August 1922, Enver became a leader in this 
rebellion which formed as a reaction to Soviet rule in Turkestan and attracted a wide variety of people including 
tribesmen who had lost their grazing lands to Russian settlers, the exiled Emir of Bukhara and Turkish 
nationalists and reformers. To understand Enver’s motives it is necessary to understand the contemporary 
political and social developments in the Ottoman Empire and Russia. I will argue that Enver’s actions must be 
placed within the context of the Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic ideologies prevalent at this time.  
 
Enver Pasha, the “Hero of Freedom” in the 1908 Young Turk revolution, was born in Istanbul in 1881 and rose 
quickly up the ranks of the military forces. He joined a political organisation called the Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP) in 1908 and became involved in the revolution that led to the restoration of the constitution and 
parliament on 23 July and the deposition of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in April 1909. In 1913, Enver and two other 
CUP members, Talat and Jemal Pashas, led a coup against the government and ruled from then on as a 
dictatorship. The Young Turks were initially very successful and popular, and regained some of the territory lost 
by the Ottoman government in the Balkan Wars. After Enver’s marriage in 1914 to the niece of Sultan Mehmet 
V, they legitimated their hold on power even further. When the First World War broke out, the Ottoman Empire 
allied itself to Germany which resulted in the loss of the Empire at the conclusion to the war in October 1918. 
The Young Turk leaders were forced to escape Istanbul on a German submarine, and were later sentenced to 
death in absentia for war crimes against the Armenians.i 
 
In order to understand the next phase of Enver’s life and the rise of the Basmachi resistance in Turkestan, it is 
necessary to look at the political and social developments up to that time. In particular, I want to trace the 
development of Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkic thought in Russia and the Ottoman Empire.ii An early influence on 
many later movements was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who in the mid-19th century advocated the need for 
Muslims to unite and modernise their society within an Islamic framework.iii Ismail Gaspirinsky, born in the 
Crimea in 1851, was influenced by the Pan-Islamic ideas of al-Afghani and also by the rising Pan-Slavic 
movement prevalent in Russia at this time. He advocated the use of one Turkic language to unite all the Turkic 
peoples,iv and started the Jadid (New Method) schools, which were widely adopted across Russia. The word 
Jadid soon became synonymous with the reform movement, and reformers were known as Jadids.v In 1905, 
Russia brought in political and social changes which allowed Muslim deputies to enter the Duma (parliament) 
and to hold the First Muslim Congress. By the Third Muslim Congress, in August 1906, opinions were divided 
on how the movement should progress. Gasprinsky felt Pan-Turkism should be confined to cultural affairs while 
other leaders such as Yusuf Akcura from the Volga area wanted more political involvement. In the end, a 
political party was created called Ittifakul-Muslimin (The Union of Muslims).vi The nationalistic nature of 
Ittifakul-Muslimin and its links to the Ottoman Empire became a concern to the Russian government, which 
defined Ittifakul-Muslimin’s aims as Pan-Islamic and Pan-Turkist. In order to control the situation, they actively 
supported the Kadimist (conservative) faction among the Turkic peoples, and limited the power of the 
reformers.vii Over time, they also lowered the number of Muslim deputies in parliament from 25 in 1906 to six 
by 1912.viii Many Tatar and Azeri Turkic nationalists migrated to the Ottoman Empire at this time and continued 
the Pan-Turkic movement from there.ix 
 
The Ottoman Empire had also experimented with a number of ideologies in the 19th century in an attempt to stop 
the loss of territory. The Tanzimat reforms and the concept of Ottomanism had tried to instill in all citizens a 
sense of equality and loyalty to the Empire,x but these ideas were rejected as the Empire continued to 
disintegrate.xi Sultan Abdul Hamid II instead emphasised his role as Caliph and Protector of Muslims,xii and 
used Pan-Islamism as a political weapon against the European powers.xiii The concept of Turkishness developed 
quite late, because Ottoman intellectuals viewed Turkish people as unsophisticated nomads and peasants. The 
Hungarian Arminius Vambery, writing in the mid-19th century said: ‘The word Turkluk … was taken to be the 
synonym of boorishness and savagery … I found nobody in Istanbul who was seriously interested in the 
question of the Turkish nationality or language.’xiv By the late 19th century this changed, as Turkish intellectuals 
became interested in surrounding nationalist movements and by European works about Turkic people such as 
Leon Cahun’s 1896 work Introduction a l’Histoire de l’Asie.xv Turkic immigrants from the Balkans and Russia, 
who by this stage comprised nearly half of the population, also influenced Turkish thought.xvi Yusuf Akcura, in 
his 1904 essay “Uc Tarz-I Siyaset” (Three Policies), compared Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism and their 
effectiveness as a policy for the Ottoman state. He concluded that the only hope for the Ottoman Empire was 
that Turks could come to an understanding of their Turkishness. However, he felt that this philosophy still 
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needed a lot of work because it was so new and that it may fail because ‘[t]he majority of the Turks today have 
forgotten their past.’xvii 
 
Turkish intellectuals such as Ziya Gokalp then took up these ideas. Gokalp, born in Diyarbekir of mixed Turkish 
and Kurdish ancestry, argued that Turks needed to find their national spirit which was located in the pre-Islamic 
history of the ancient Turks and rulers such as Genghis Khan and Timur.xviii He set up museums and libraries 
and was a member of the Turk Ocaklari (Turkish Hearth) established in 1911 to awaken a pride in 
Turkishness.xix In his poem “Turan” he stated: ‘The country of the Turks is not Turkey, nor yet Turkestan. Their 
country is a broad everlasting land—Turan.’xx The Young Turks were greatly influenced by the Pan-Turkic 
ideas of Gokalp and Akcura,xxi and included them as members of their central committee.xxii The Turk Ocaklari 
became a meeting ground for nationalists and once the war started also took on the function of dispatching 
agents abroad to propagate Pan-Turkism. Enver patronised an organisation called Izco (Boy Scouts), which 
British intelligence said gave military training to Turkish youth who were indoctrinated in pre-Islamic Turkic 
beliefs and rituals. It was even claimed the boys said their prayers to the ancient Turkish God Tanri, rather than 
Allah. xxiii In a speech delivered by the President of the Ottoman Chamber, Halil Bey, in May 1914, their focus 
was clearly stated: ‘I ask our teachers, journalists, poets and all our intellectuals to remind continuously our 
present generation and the future ones, via their lessons, writings and moral influence, that beyond the frontiers 
there are brethren to be liberated and bits of the Fatherland to be redeemed.’xxiv  
 
From the time they took power, the Young Turks were involved in political activities in Russian territory. In 
1910, British intelligence reported that Enver, as Consul-General at Tabriz, was plotting with the Karadag 
Khans in Azerbaijan, and that Talat was supplying arms to Turkic peoples in Russian territory. From 1911, CUP 
branches were established in Russia and Turkish agents spread Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic propaganda to the 
Muslim populations. During the war, the Young Turks made a number of tactical and moral errors which are 
difficult to explain unless Pan-Turkic ideology is taken into account. In December 1914, Enver, in command of 
the Third Army on the Russian front at Sarikamis, lost most of his 90,000 troops due to poor and rushed tactical 
planning.xxv Following this, in 1915, as Minister of War, he decided to deport the Armenian population to 
internment camps in Syria, resulting in the death or exile of almost all of the Armenians of Anatolia.xxvi The 
official reason given was that the Armenians were aiding Russian forces, but they were also located in the way 
of a potential Pan-Turkic territory.xxvii 
 
The 1917 Revolution was seen by Enver as an opportunity to move into the Turkic areas in Russia,xxviii and this 
led to his decision, in May 1918, to transfer vital military units from the Middle East to the Republic of 
Azerbaijan in order to gain control of Baku and the Caspian Sea. In doing this, he acted against the wishes of the 
Germans, who were in negotiation with the Soviets regarding access to the Baku oil supply. xxix By September, 
Enver’s brother Nuri Pasha, with an army of 60,000 men, defeated the British forces and took Baku, but the 
victory was short-lived, as they were expelled again by the British after the Armistice was signed in October 
1918.xxx Some historians have suggested that the desire of the Young Turks for a Pan-Turkic Empire in Russia 
was so strong that it was a major factor in their decision to enter the war in the first place.xxxi This is supported 
by a proclamation released by the Young Turks on entering the war: ‘The ideal of our nation and our people 
leads us towards the destruction of our Muscovite enemy, in order to obtain thereby a natural frontier to our 
Empire, which should include and unite all branches of our race.’xxxii  
 
In Russia, the situation of the Turkic peoples went through a period of massive change in the time leading up to 
the revolution, and the formation of the Basmachi resistance stemmed from these developments. Since 1912, the 
Russian government had successfully quelled Turkish nationalism in the Tatar areas, and the conservative 
faction maintained control. Turkish intellectuals focused instead on strengthening the Tatar position within the 
Russian system, a process which was helped by their acceptance into all levels of Russian society.xxxiii When 
World War One commenced, the Tatar newspaper Turmush said that Turks should support their Russian 
compatriots, and the Muslim faction of the Duma stated that Muslims should ‘fight to the end for the honor and 
integrity of Russia.’xxxiv This was not the case in Turkestan, which had been a centre of rebellion and activism 
since the Russian conquest in the late 19th century. Turkic nomads lost their grazing lands to Russian settlers, 
and in 1907 the president of the agricultural association said that the Kazaks, as descendents of barbarians such 
as Ghengiz and Timur, deserved destruction. The agricultural lands of the Oases and the Ferghana Valley were 
also turned over to cotton production which led to a dependence on Russia for food and resulted in a widespread 
famine. The first rebellion occurred in 1898, when Kazak and Kirgiz tribesmen and bankrupt farmers led by 
Dukchi Ishan, a village Imam, destroyed a Russian barracks in Ferghana. Although the revolt was crushed and 
the leaders killed, the underlying causes were not fixed. The 1916 Merdikar (man of work) revolt, against the 
call up for non-combatant service in the war, started in the Kazak steppe and extended into Ferghana and Uzbek 
country. Russian troops and colonists were murdered, and, in retaliation, thousands of tribespeople were 
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massacred.xxxv The tribesmen fled to the mountains and formed a guerilla movement which later merged with 
the Basmachi.xxxvi 
 
The 1917 February revolution was welcomed an opportunity for change by Turkic peoples, and in May 800 
delegates attended an All Muslim Congress in Moscow. The divisions in Turkic society soon became apparent 
at this congress, with disagreement among the conservative Ulema, liberal Jadids, Socialists and Muslim 
Communists, as well as between Turks from different areas, on the form of state they should adopt.xxxvii The 
final vote led to a decision to create a number of autonomous democratic republics with a central Muslim 
administration.xxxviii Before these organisations could be set up, the Russian provisional government fell to the 
Bolsheviks on October 26, 1917.xxxix Soon after taking power, Lenin and Stalin issued a declaration that said the 
Soviets would adopt the following principles: ‘(1) equality and sovereignty of the nations of Russia (2) the right 
of the nations of Russia to free self-determination, including the right to secede and form independent states 
…’.
xl
 This was followed by manifesto addressed to ‘All the toiling Muhammadians in Russia and in the East’: 
‘Henceforth your faith and customs, your national and cultural institutions, are proclaimed freely and 
unhindered. This is your right.’xli 
 
Lenin’s speech was taken at face value, as a go-ahead for Turkic groups to set up their own governments, and a 
number of Turkic republics were formed. The first was the Bashkurd Republic created on November 21 and 
based at Orenburg under the leadership of Ahmed Zeki Velidi Togan, a reformer and nationalist.xlii In Tashkent, 
the Ulema also proposed to form a coalition government with the Russian Soviets.xliii But the Russian-
dominated group refused to co-operate with the Muslims because ‘[t]here are no proletarian class organisations 
among the native inhabitants.’xliv This rejection led to an unlikely alliance of the Jadids and Ulema, who, on 
November 28, announced the creation of the Kokand Republic. Led by a Jajid, Mustafa Chokai,xlv it was Pan-
Turkic in ideology, and included delegates from around Turkestan.xlvi The Tashkent Soviets, acting 
independently of the Moscow government attempted to crush both republics. They sent Red Troops to Orenburg 
in February 1918, and arrested the leaders of the Bashkurd government,xlvii and on February 19 they razed 
Kokand, killing large numbers of people.xlviii The Bashkurd Republic was luckier than Kokand, as Russian 
White forces re-took Orenburg in April and released the Bashkurd leaders from prison. Togan then built up a 
strong army, and by February 1919 was able to negotiate with Moscow and achieve autonomy in exchange for 
supporting the Soviets.xlix 
 
The Central party in Moscow blamed the Turkic separatist movements on the refusal of the Tashkent Soviets to 
include Muslims in the party organisation. They forced the Tashkent government to co-operate with the 
Muslims and by June 1919 Muslims held four of the eleven seats in the Communist party.l The end result of the 
Soviet actions was that Jadid Communists took control of the Tashkent party, which they renamed the Turkic 
Communist Party, and said their purpose was ‘[c]onsolidating and attracting other Turkic nationalities … around 
a Turkic Soviet republic.’li They were soon joined by a group of Young Bukharans who had attempted to bring 
in reforms in Bukhara and escaped a purge by the Emir.lii Once the Soviets realised the danger the Jadids posed 
to central rule, they brought in other means to control them. In the Bashkurd Republic they destroyed Togan’s 
military advantage by sending his forces away to fight in other parts of Russia. They also put Soviet agents into 
the Kokand government, and in May 1920 issued a decree subordinating the Bashkurd republic to the central 
party.liii In June 1920, a commission sent to assess the situation in Tashkent concluded that the Jadid 
Communists were Turkish nationalists who supported the Basmachi. They removed them from the party, and 
instead appointed conservative Muslim delegates whom they could control. The Soviets also destroyed the 
Emir’s regime, and created a People’s Republic of Bukhara run jointly by the Young Bukharans and the 
Communists.liv The Young Khiva Party seized power from the Khan of Khiva, and also began to rule in alliance 
with Soviets. However, neither Khiva nor Bukhara had an army or any real power, and were easily absorbed 
into the Soviet system.lv Togan, in an attempt to save the Bashkurd Republic by political means, had met with 
Stalin in Moscow in May 1920. In his account of the meeting he sums up the Soviet attitude: lvi ‘He was very 
friendly, and it seemed as if his heart burned for the Eastern Turks, for us small nations. But he told me—as had 
Lenin a few days before—I ought to do my duty in the spirit of Great Russia and not to worry so much about 
governing a small tribe.’lvii  
 
It was into this political environment that Enver and Jemal entered when they arrived in Moscow in 1920. The 
Soviets gave them protection in exchange for help in spreading communism to Muslims, and Jemal was sent to 
Kabul to stir up rebellion among Muslims in British India.lviii The Soviets hoped Enver could take communism 
into Anatolia,lix but his attempts to liaise with the Ankara government were rejected by Kemal, who saw him as 
a threat to his leadership. Enver then made Baku a rival centre of power to Ankara, from where he maintained 
contact with former CUP members in the resistance movement.lx From July, Enver and his men waited near the 
Turkish border at Batumi, and British Intelligence reported that his aim was to enter Anatolia and overthrow 
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Kemal.lxi However, in September Kemal won a major victory against the Greeks at Sakarya and consolidated his 
position as leader. He immediately declared an alliance with the Soviets, who then moved away from their plan 
to support Enver in Anatolia.lxii 
 
Meanwhile, in Turkestan, the Basmachi rebellion had become a real problem for the Soviets. It had started in 
1918, when survivors from the Kokand massacre organised the tribesmen who had escaped the 1916 rebellion 
into a guerilla resistance movement.lxiii The rebellion grew as it became clear that the Turkic republics had no 
chance of autonomy under Soviet rule. lxiv In 1920, the exiled Emir of Bukhara and his supporters joined the 
movement which led to an unlikely alliance of the conservatives and the reformers.lxv The Soviets sent Enver to 
Tashkent in October 1921, in the hope that he could suppress the rebellion. Instead Enver saw an opportunity to 
lead a Turkish nationalist movement in Turkestan. This was a dangerous move, as the Soviets had already 
recalled Jemal to Moscow for stirring up Turkic nationalism and suspected links to the Basmachi.lxvi Togan 
advised Enver it would be safer to build a resistance movement from Afghanistan.lxvii Enver, however, was not 
convinced and in a letter to his wife dated 7 November 1921 he made his intentions clear: ‘Yesterday I sent 
letters to the capitals of Bokhara and Khiva, and I signed these as Commander of the Supreme Turanian 
Revolutionary Armies. The die is cast … I can now return only after complete success …’.lxviii  
 
What Enver did not initially understand was that the Basmachi were mostly comprised of tribesmen who were 
fighting for their traditional way of life. The ties that bound them were Islamic, not nationalistic,lxix and they had 
little in common with the Jadids.lxx Their lack of a common aim, apart from removing the Soviets, can be seen in 
the following example. Jemal had in 1920 sent the following message to the Basmachi: ‘Our aim is to find a 
means to force the Russians to accept our proposals, to strengthen the national union, inspire a modern, national, 
political spirit … to get rid of the shameful and disturbing activities of the Emir’s adherents …’.lxxi When a 
young Jadid tried to explain these ideas to Toghay, a tribal chief, Toghay took from a sack a bunch of human 
ears which he said were cut from the heads of reformers.lxxii Enver and his men were greeted with suspicion by 
the Basmachi, and were taken prisoner by Ibrahim Bey, a local tribal leader. They were only released when the 
ex-Emir of Bukhara gave Enver the title of Ghazi and accepted him as a leader.lxxiii Enver, realising that the 
binding force of the tribes was not Turkic nationalism but Islam, then sent out the proclamation: ‘I, who am the 
irreconcilable enemy of the infidels, salute you, the ghazis, who are fighting for the preservation of religion and 
fatherland … I have declared jihad against the Russians …’.lxxiv Enver then had a number of successes, and by 
early in 1922 controlled a large part of Eastern Bukhara. A report from the Times at the time stated: ‘The 
insurgent movement with Enver’s name at its head and his brain and the organising and technical skill of his 
considerable staff of Young Turk officers to direct it, has made progress … there is no doubt that Enver has got 
the insurgent movement going with more organisation and more co-ordination that it has had before, and that 
the Bolsheviks are finding the situation difficult to handle.’lxxv 
   
By April 1922, the Soviets decided to negotiate with Enver and offered independence to Turkestan and Bukhara 
within the Soviet system.lxxvi Enver refused their offer, and demanded that they withdraw completely from 
Turkestan, with the result that Enver, with the support of only 3000 men,lxxvii found himself up against a Soviet 
army of 20,000 men.lxxviii At first he used guerilla tactics to maintain his hold on strategic positions such as the 
railway line to Termez and the Oxus River,lxxix but foolishly attempted open warfare against the Soviets.lxxx He 
also lost the assistance of the Emir, who resented Enver for adopting the title Commander in Chief of All the 
Mujahideen and saw him as a rival for his own position. By July Enver and his men were short of ammunition, 
and their escape routes into Afghanistan were blocked by the Soviets. They eventually retreated towards the 
Pamir Mountains near Baisun, where they were killed in a battle on 4 August 1922 at the village of Baljiwan.lxxxi 
Enver’s death was used by the various factions for political mileage. The Soviets found it helpful to keep him 
alive and reported later in 1922 that peace had been established between Enver and Moscow. Basmachi leaders 
also decided not to release news of his death in case it affected the resistance movement. However, by the end of 
October, Afghani papers published eyewitness accounts of his death that stated it occurred on the eve of the Eid 
celebration, when most of his forces had returned home. Enver was shot by Soviet machine gun fire while 
making a cavalry charge,lxxxii and his body was later found by a local imam, who buried him at Abirderya 
village.lxxxiii 
 
The Basmachi movement continued for another decade after Enver’s death. Haji Sami, described by British 
intelligence files as ‘One of the cleverest and most valuable Pan-Islamic agents of the Committee of Union and 
Progress,’ lxxxiv took over leadership of Enver’s forces. However, unable to gain aid or supplies, both he and 
Togan were eventually forced to escape Soviet territory.lxxxv By 1931, Ibrahim Bey was captured, and, with the 
movement lacking leadership, the Soviets were able to quell the remaining rebellion.lxxxvi They initially adopted 
a tactic of supporting Islam in order to gain the people’s trust, they then appointed pro-Soviet imams who 
announced that Muslims should obey the Soviet state, and the Basmachi rebellion eventually died down.lxxxvii 
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Togan, who made his way to Istanbul, sent a letter to Lenin, Stalin and Trotsky which sums up the Soviet 
strategy with the Turkic peoples: ‘Everything has turned out as the Russians wished it … cooperation with us 
has been a pure pretence …’.lxxxviii 
 
In conclusion, Enver has been portrayed by some historians as a rash adventurer who took a desperate gamble 
with the Basmachi because he had no other options.lxxxix While I agree that Enver did initially misjudge the 
situation, and did not understand the divisions within the Basmachi, I do not think his decision to join was a 
desperate last resort. Firstly, it is important to remember that, even after the war, Enver had the support of a 
number of former CUP members and ex-Ottoman army officers who had escaped Turkey. This included Jemal 
Pasha, who also attempted to propagate Turkic nationalism amongst the tribes in Central Asia. Enver’s first 
preference was naturally to return to the Ottoman Empire as leader of the resistance movement. When this was 
ruled out by Kemal’s success he still did not have to join the Basmachi. He could have supported the Soviets or 
he could have taken Togan’s advice and built up a resistance movement from Afghanistan. It is clear to me that 
Enver had a long-standing desire to rule in Central Asia, which came to the fore when he found himself in a 
position to make it happen. I think it is likely he thought he could create a Pan-Turkic power in Central Asia and 
then move back into Turkey as a victor at a later date.  
 
Enver’s decision to lead the Basmachi resistance is understandable when viewed within the context of his Pan-
Turkic ideology. Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism were the dominant political ideologies in the Ottoman Empire 
in the early 20th century. A desire for a Pan-Turkic state influenced a number of the decisions the Young Turks 
made during World War One. Looking at the situation in retrospect, Enver would probably have been better to 
take Togan’s advice and work on a resistance movement from Afghanistan. He may have had more success if he 
had arrived in Tashkent in 1917, at the time Togan and the nationalists had formed the Bashkurd Republic. He 
would have found more in common with a movement comprised of Jadids and Turkic nationalists than he did 
with the Basmachi tribesmen. Enver also made some tactical errors that may have affected the outcome of the 
struggle, such as engaging in open warfare, his alienation of the Emir of Bukhara, and his uncompromising 
attitude to the Soviets in April 1922. 
 
Even though Enver had the odds stacked against him, he did manage to unite a large number of tribesmen in his 
short time as a leader, and had a number of early victories. He was quick to realise the importance of Islam to 
the Basmachi, and put aside his Pan-Turkic leanings for a Pan-Islamic stance to gain legitimacy. By all accounts 
Enver was successful in doing this, and commanded a lot of respect among his men. His grave is still a site of 
pilgrimage for the descendents of the tribesmen who fought with him.xc In Togan’s account of the Basmachi 
movement, Enver is depicted as a Turkish hero.xci I would like to finish with a quote from Enver that nicely 
sums up his attitude to the situation he found himself in: ‘The other day I read a German book, and one sentence 




                                               
REFERENCES 
 
ii Suhnaz Yilmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad: Enver Pasha as an Expatriate,” Middle Eastern Studies 35.4 
(1999): 47. 
ii
 Charles Warren Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets: The Turks of the World and their Political Objectives 
(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1957), 122. 
iii
 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), 108–109. 
iv
 Jacob M. Laundau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation (London: Hurst & Company, 1995), 10. 
v
 Serge A. Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1967), 34–35. 
vi
 Laundau, Pan-Turkism, 11–14. 
vii
 Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, 131. 
viii
 Ibid, 136. 
ix
 Laundau, Pan-Turkism, 13. 
x
 Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (New York: 
New York University Press, 1997), 51. 
xi
 Laundau, Pan-Turkism, 74. 
xii
 Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, 58. 
104 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
xiii
 Kemal H. Karpat, “Historical Continuity and Identity Change or How to be Modern Muslim, Ottoman, and 
Turk*,” in Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey, edited by Kemal Karpat (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 15–16. 
xiv
 Vambery cited in Tekin Alp, “The Restoration of Turkish History,” in Nationalism in Asia and Africa, ed. 
Elie Kedourie (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 209. 
xv
 Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gokalp (London: Luzac & 
Company Ltd, 1950), 105. 
xvi
 Karpat, “Historical Continuity and Identity Change,” 23. 
xvii
 Yusuf Akcura, “Uc Tarz-I Siyaset (Three Policies),” in Central Asian Monuments, ed. H. B. Paksoy. 
(Istanbul: ISIS Press, n.d.). 
xviii
 Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, 111–112. 
xix
 Kemal H. Karpat, “The People’s Houses in Turkey: Establishment and Growth,” The Middle East Journal 
XVII (1963): 56.  
xx
 Gokalp cited in Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, 83. 
xxi
 Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, 21. 
xxii
 Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, 107. 
xxiii
 Laundau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation, 42. 
xxiv
 Halil Bey cited in Laundau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation, 42. 
xxv
 Yilmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad,” 40–47 
xxvi
 Ibid, 40–47.  
xxvii
 Laundau, Pan-Turkism, 49–53. 
xxviii
 Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, 152. 
xxix
 Laundau, Pan-Turkism, 54. 
xxx
 Comtois, Pierre. “Battle for Baku,” Military History 22.4 (2005): 56–72. 
xxxi
 Laundau, Pan-Turkism, 52–54. 
xxxii
 Ibid, 53. 
xxxiii
 Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, 117. 
xxxiv
 Ibid, 123–124. 
xxxv
 Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1954), 
83–90. 
xxxvi
 Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, 133. 
xxxvii
 Ibid, 142. 
xxxviii
 Ibid, 150. 
xxxix
 Ibid, 159. 
xl
 Caroe, Soviet Empire, 105. 
xli
 Ibid, 105. 
xlii
 Ibid, 104. 
xliii
 Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, 222. 
xliv
 Ibid, 233. 
xlv
 Ibid, 234. 
xlvi
 Laundau, Pan-Turkism, 17. 
xlvii
 Caroe, Soviet Empire, 104–105. 
xlviii
 Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, 222. 
xlix
 Caroe, Soviet Empire, 106–107. 
l
 Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, 239–242. 
li
 Ibid, 244. 
lii
 Ibid, 238. 
liii
 Caroe, Soviet Empire, 109. 
liv
 Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, 245–252. 
lv
 Caroe, Soviet Empire, 118. 
lvi
 Ibid, 109. 
lvii
 Togan cited in Caroe, Soviet Empire, 110. 
lviii
 Ibid, 123. 
lix
 Salahi R. Sonyel, “Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1919-22,” Middle Eastern Studies 25.4 (1989): 510. 
lx
 Yilmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad,” 48–52. 
lxi
 Sonyel, “Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1919–22,” 510. 
lxii
 Yilmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad,” 54. 
lxiii
 Caroe, Soviet Empire, 107. 
lxiv
 Laundau, Pan-Turkism, 17. 
lxv
 Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, 226. 
105 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
lxvi
 Caroe, Soviet Empire, 123. 
lxvii
 Yilmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad,” 54–55. 
lxviii
 Enver Pasha cited in Sonyel, “Mustafa Kemal and Enver in Conflict, 1919–22,” 54. 
lxix
 Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, 8. 
lxx
 Caroe, Soviet Empire, 121. 
lxxi
 Jemal Pasha quoted in Caroe, Soviet Empire, 120. 
lxxii
 Caroe, Soviet Empire, 120. 
lxxiii
 Yilmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad,” 56. 
lxxiv
 Enver cited in S. R. Sonyel, “Enver Pasha and the Basmaji Movement in Central Asia,” Middle Eastern 
Studies 26.1 (1990): 55. 
lxxv
 “Enver Pasha Enigma,” The Times, 15 June 1922, 9. 
lxxvi
 Sonyel, “Enver Pasha and the Basmaji Movement in Central Asia,” 56. 
lxxvii
 Yilmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad,” 59. 
lxxviii
 Sonyel, “Enver Pasha and the Basmaji Movement in Central Asia,” 58. 
lxxix
 Glenda Fraser, “Enver Pasha’s Bid for Turkestan 1920–1922,” Canadian Journal of History 22 (1988): 
206–207. 
lxxx
 Yilmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad,” 62. 
lxxxi
 Sonyel, “Enver Pasha and the Basmaji Movement in Central Asia,” 55–61. 
lxxxii
 Yilmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad,” 60–61. 
lxxxiii
 Sonyel, “Enver Pasha and the Basmaji Movement in Central Asia,” 61. 
lxxxiv
 Glenda A. Fraser, “Haji Sami and the Turkestan Federation, 1922–3,” Asian Affairs 18.1 (1987): 11. 
lxxxv
 Fraser, “Haji Sami and the Turkestan Federation, 1922–3,” 17–20. 
lxxxvi
 Caroe, Soviet Empire, 127. 
lxxxvii
 Zenkovsky, Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia, 273. 
lxxxviii
 Togan cited in Caroe, Soviet Empire, 113. 
lxxxix
 Fraser, “Enver Pasha’s Bid for Turkestan 1920–1922,” 197. 
xc
 Peter Hopkirk, Setting the East Ablaze: On Secret Service in Bolshevik Asia (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1984), 170. 
xci
 Caroe, Soviet Empire, 126. 
xcii
 Enver cited in Yilmaz, “An Ottoman Warrior Abroad,” 65. 
